independent journalist
Yükleniyor...
The AKP Government Tested the Constitution Without a Referendum

The AKP Government Tested the Constitution Without a Referendum

The combined votes of the AKP, MHP, DEM, CHP, HÜDA PAR, and DSP reach 429. In the latest vote, with the support of the CHP, a total of 467 v...

The combined votes of the AKP, MHP, DEM, CHP, HÜDA PAR, and DSP reach 429. In the latest vote, with the support of the CHP, a total of 467 votes was reached, meaning the AKP has effectively conducted a test for amending the constitution.

The bill adopted in the Parliament within the scope of a 'Terror-Free Turkey' received 467 votes with the support of the CHP under its 'invalid' administration. On the same day, the CHP candidate won the deputy mayoral election in the Ankara Etimesgut Municipality with the backing of the AKP and MHP. Thus, the People's Alliance saw that it could change the constitution without a referendum with the CHP's support.


















Erdoğan's Goal

When the framework law secured well over 400 votes, AKP deputies commented, 'The visa for a new constitution has now been obtained.' Once Parliament reconvenes on October 1, the new constitution will dominate the political agenda. Seeking to run for president again, Erdoğan is aiming for a system with no term limits through a constitutional amendment.

In this new process, the AKP, MHP, and DEM collaborated fully. The combined seat count of these three parties reaches a total of 379, consisting of 277 for the AKP, 56 for DEM, and 46 for the MHP. In this scenario, 45 of the CHP's deputies play a key role. If the CHP also supports this tripartite alliance, a total of 424 deputies is reached. Consequently, constitutional amendments could be made without the support of the Yeni Parti, Yeni Yol, and other small parties. With the addition of HÜDA PAR's 4 deputies and the DSP's 1 deputy, this figure rises to 429.







The Trial Run Was Held in Etimesgut

The clearest example of how the CHP might align with the People's Alliance (AKP-MHP) in the new era occurred the other day. During the deputy mayoral election in Etimesgut, candidates from the Yeni Parti and the CHP ran against each other. When council members from the CHP, AKP, and MHP acted in unison, the CHP candidate was elected over the Yeni Parti's candidate. Similar dynamics are at play in the Menderes and Üsküdar municipalities. The situation within the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) Council is also critical. If 10 CHP members were to switch sides, control of the İBB could also change hands.

The Ambiguity of Peace Analyzing Türkiye's New "Framework Law" and the Challenges Ahead

The Ambiguity of Peace Analyzing Türkiye's New "Framework Law" and the Challenges Ahead

On August 10, 2026, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) ratified one of the most consequential and heavily debated pieces of legislat...

On August 10, 2026, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) ratified one of the most consequential and heavily debated pieces of legislation in the Republic's modern history. Officially titled the "Law Proposal on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration" (Millî Dayanışma ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun Teklifi)—but widely known as the "Framework Law" (Çerçeve Yasa)—the bill passed after an exhausting 12-hour session. The final tally recorded 468 votes in favor, 88 against, and 6 abstentions out of the 562 participating parliamentarians.

Marketed by the ruling coalition as the cornerstone of a "Terror-Free Türkiye", the law outlines a conditional amnesty and social reintegration program following declarations of disarmament by the PKK/KCK. However, beneath the sweeping rhetoric of unity and historic resolution lies a deeply ambiguous text. By leaving critical enforcement mechanisms open-ended and centralizing the assessment process within the executive branch, the Framework Law introduces a precarious set of legal, political, and societal challenges for Türkiye's immediate future.

Cumhuriyet











The Architecture of the Legislation

To understand the risks embedded in the Framework Law, one must first examine its mechanics. The 12-article legislation essentially establishes a conditional pause on prosecutions and the execution of sentences for individuals associated with the PKK/KCK and its affiliated structures.

The primary trigger for the law is a two-step verification process: security forces must first confirm that the organization has entirely dissolved its operational existence and surrendered all weaponry, a finding that must then be officially validated by the National Security Council (MGK) and published in the Official Gazette. Only after this MGK decree does a six-month window open for written applications and weapon handovers. For those who qualify, ongoing prosecutions carrying a maximum sentence of 15 years are suspended for 5 years, while sentences exceeding 15 years or carrying life imprisonment are suspended for 10 years, provided the individual commits no further crimes during the probationary period.

The Danger of the "Open-Ended" Framework

The most glaring vulnerability of the Framework Law is its open-ended nature. Legislation dealing with national security, transitional justice, and amnesty demands airtight definitions to prevent arbitrary application; yet, this law is riddled with interpretive voids.

First, the concept of "complete disarmament and dissolution" is politically and logistically nebulous. How the state will quantify and verify the total eradication of decentralized militant structures operating across transnational borders remains dangerously unclear. By placing the ultimate authority to declare the end of terror in the hands of the MGK, the law effectively bypasses robust judicial and parliamentary scrutiny, transferring a monumental legal trigger to an executive security organ.

Furthermore, the legal terminology regarding who exactly benefits from the suspensions is highly complex. While the law excludes "intentional homicide committed within the framework of organizational activity" and life sentences for crimes committed prior to June 1, 2005, drawing clear distinctions in decades-old, multi-defendant terror trials will inevitably lead to immense judicial bottlenecks. The ambiguity risks creating a two-tiered justice system where subjective interpretations by localized execution judges (infaz hâkimleri) could result in vastly different outcomes for similar offenses.

The Erosion of Parliamentary Oversight

While the law mandates the creation of a 17-member TBMM Monitoring Commission to oversee the process, the actual implementation, coordination, and follow-up are dominated by the executive branch. A special board, chaired by the Vice President and comprising key cabinet ministers (Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense) along with the heads of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the MGK, will direct the reintegration process.

This centralization of power is a critical flaw. By relegating the parliament to a mere "monitoring" role, the Framework Law stifles the broad, transparent democratic consensus required for a societal trauma of this magnitude. In a polarized political environment, peace processes managed behind closed executive doors historically suffer from a profound lack of public trust.

Societal Pushback and the Road Ahead

The 88 "No" votes and 6 abstentions in the TBMM highlight the deep reservations simmering within the Turkish public. Opposition voices, notably from the İYİ Party, dissenting factions within the Yeni Party, and the Yeniden Refah Party, signal a significant segment of the electorate that views the law not as a masterstroke of peace, but as a dangerous concession.

Türkiye faces three immediate challenges in the wake of this legislation:

  1. Societal Polarization: The abrupt transition from decades of intensive counter-terrorism rhetoric to a framework of "reintegration" risks alienating nationalist and conservative voter bases, as well as the families of terror victims, leading to severe social friction.
  2. Implementation Gridlock: The 6-month window following the MGK's declaration will be a logistical nightmare. The judicial system, already burdened, must rapidly process highly sensitive intelligence to determine eligibility without violating the law's stated exceptions.
  3. The Threat of Relapse: Without a parallel, comprehensive plan addressing underlying socioeconomic and political grievances, the legal mechanisms of the Framework Law may only offer a temporary freeze on conflict rather than a permanent cure.

The ratification of the Framework Law on August 10, 2026, marks an undeniable turning point for Türkiye. However, passing a law in parliament is vastly different from cementing peace on the ground. With its open-ended criteria, heavy reliance on executive decrees, and complex legal loopholes, the "Çerçeve Yasa" is less a definitive roadmap to a "Terror-Free Türkiye" and more a precarious gamble. If the ambiguities of the text are exploited, or if the process lacks the transparency required to build genuine public consensus, this framework may ultimately construct the scaffolding for Türkiye's next political crisis rather than its long-awaited peace.

YENİ Party Reaches Decision on  Framework Law

YENİ Party Reaches Decision on Framework Law

A Shift Toward Individual Conscience in Parliament Party leader Özgür Özel announces that lawmakers will vote independently on the controver...

A Shift Toward Individual Conscience in Parliament

Party leader Özgür Özel announces that lawmakers will vote independently on the controversial "Terror-Free Türkiye" initiative.

The political landscape in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) witnessed a significant development today as the YENİ Party finalized its stance on the highly debated "Framework Law." Following a critical closed-door group meeting chaired by Party Leader Özgür Özel, the party leadership arrived at a decision that breaks from traditional party block voting: they have opted against enforcing a unified position among their deputies.

Spearheaded by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), alongside the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), the "Framework Law" has been drafted under the broader, ambitious umbrella of a proposed "Terror-Free Türkiye" initiative. However, the legislative move has sparked intense public and political debate across the nation. Critics and observers have pointed out that the bill reportedly includes specific provisions that could pave the way for the postponement of sentences for individuals affiliated with the PKK—a highly sensitive issue in Turkish politics.

Flickr











The Internal Debate and the Decision for Free Will

During their extensive internal discussions, senior officials and members of the YENİ Party rigorously evaluated the proposed legislation. Sources close to the meeting indicated that several lawmakers drew sharp attention to what they perceived as serious shortcomings and ambiguities within the text of the proposed regulation. As the debate concluded, the party leadership determined that imposing a strict 'yes' or 'no' mandate would not reflect the diverse concerns and perspectives of their constituency. Consequently, it was resolved that all 91 of the YENİ Party's parliamentary deputies will cast their votes based entirely on their own free will and personal initiative.

"By allowing a free vote, the YENİ Party leadership is transferring the immense political responsibility of this controversial bill directly onto the shoulders of its individual lawmakers, acknowledging the complex moral and political dimensions of the 'Framework Law'."

The party itself, as an institution, will formally abstain from adopting a binding collective position on the legislation. This move is seen by some political analysts as a strategic maneuver to maintain party unity while avoiding the potential fallout of officially endorsing or rejecting a bill fraught with such deep historical and emotional resonance.

Implications for the General Assembly Vote

YENİ Party Chairman Özgür Özel is expected to take the rostrum at the General Assembly shortly to officially declare this free-vote strategy. By publicly announcing that the party will leave the final decision to the individual consciences of the lawmakers, Özel is setting a precedent for how the opposition might handle deeply polarizing legislative proposals in the current parliamentary term.

The upcoming vote on the "Framework Law" is now more unpredictable. With the YENİ Party's 91 deputies voting independently, the final tally will likely be a close reflection of individual negotiations, regional constituent pressures, and the personal political convictions of the lawmakers involved.

As the TBMM prepares for the pivotal session, all eyes remain focused on the parliamentary floor to see how this reliance on individual conscience will ultimately shape the outcome of the "Terror-Free Türkiye" initiative and alter the broader legislative dynamics in Ankara.

The Marginalization of Parliament and Legislative Hegemony

The Marginalization of Parliament and Legislative Hegemony

A Critical Analysis of the AKP-MHP Ruling Coalition in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye Since the transition to the Presidential Syste...

A Critical Analysis of the AKP-MHP Ruling Coalition in the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye

Since the transition to the Presidential System of Governance in July 2018, the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM) has undergone a profound structural shift. Once the primary forum for democratic deliberation, legislative oversight, and consensus-building, the parliament has increasingly been reduced to a ratifying mechanism under the parliamentary majority of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). This paper analyzes how the AKP-MHP alliance has systematicized the use of "omnibus bills" (torba yasa) to bypass parliamentary debate, centralize economic and judicial power, enforce selective legal standards, and systematically block socio-economic relief proposals introduced by opposition parties. Through a critical examination of recent legislative developments, this study demonstrates how executive-driven legislation has undermined democratic checks and balances at the expense of public welfare, judicial impartiality, and environmental protection.

Legislative Disempowerment Under the Presidential System

The constitutional referendum of 2017 and its subsequent implementation in July 2018 fundamentally restructured the Turkish state architecture, concentrating unprecedented executive authority in the Presidency while stripping the Grand National Assembly of its historical oversight role. In a healthy constitutional democracy, parliament serves as a counterweight to executive power, ensuring that legislative proposals undergo rigorous committee scrutiny, public debate, and cross-party negotiation. However, during the 28th Legislative Term, the Turkish Parliament has increasingly functioned under the shadow of the ruling coalition’s mechanical majority.

Rather than acting as a representative body responsive to citizen demands, the Assembly has been characterized by a recurring parliamentary phrase: "Rejected by the votes of the AKP and MHP." This phrase encapsulates a broader systemic trend wherein legislative priorities are dictated top-down by the executive branch, while motions originating from opposition parties—even those addressing acute socio-economic crises—are dismissed without substantive debate.

Fast-Track Governance and the Abuse of "Omnibus Bills"

A central mechanism in weakening legislative scrutiny has been the widespread reliance on "omnibus bills" (torba yasa). Originally designed as exceptional measures to address urgent, technical administrative needs, omnibus bills under the AKP-MHP administration have become the primary method of lawmaking. These packages bundle dozens of unrelated statutory amendments—ranging from tax adjustments and real estate regulations to judicial procedures and executive appointments—into a single legislative vote.

The structural impact of this method is twofold:
  1. Suppression of Debate: By grouping disparate policies together, the ruling coalition prevents item-by-item parliamentary debate, forcing lawmakers to vote on complex, multi-sector reforms under compressed timelines.
  2. Obfuscation of Controversial Provisions: Highly controversial measures are routinely embedded within broader, seemingly neutral legislative packages to minimize public scrutiny and expedite passage without meaningful opposition input.
Consequently, parliament has been transformed from an arena of genuine policy deliberation into an administrative stamp of approval for executive decrees and alliance-driven legislation.

Economic Redistribution, Fiscal Burden, and Environmental Deregulation

The legislative priorities of the AKP-MHP coalition reflect a distinct pattern of fiscal centralization and burden-shifting onto working-class citizens, alongside regulatory rollbacks in environmental management:

  • Centralization of Cultural Assets and Tax Hikes: Through revisions to the Foundations Law (Vakıflar Kanunu), legislative amendments facilitated the transfer of cultural and municipal assets from opposition-led local governments to central government authorities and affiliated foundations. Concurrently, tax packages imposed elevated license fees, duties, and financial surcharges across diverse occupational groups—including physicians, real estate agents, agricultural workers, and taxi drivers.
  • Capital Protection and Wealth Amnesty: While ordinary wage earners face heightened indirect taxation, the ruling alliance enacted "Wealth Amnesty" (Varlık Barışı) legislation. By offering a 20-year tax exemption on capital brought from abroad without requiring proof of origin, the measure created legislative loopholes for unverified capital flows while privileging offshore wealth over domestic taxpaying citizens.
  • Environmental Commodification: Legislative amendments opened finalized forest zones (orman statüsü kesinleşmiş alanlar) to private ownership and commercial transfer, prioritizing real estate expansion and capital accumulation over environmental conservation and public land preservation.

Selective Judicial Reforms and Administrative Control

The legislative agenda of the AKP-MHP coalition in the judiciary and administrative sectors further illustrates a pattern of legal double standards and regulatory expansion:

Selective Judicial Reforms: In the 11th Judicial Package, insult offenses were made eligible for pre-payment or out-of-court settlements, yet "insulting a public official" (kamu görevlisine hakaret) was deliberately excluded. This distinction shields public officials from public criticism while maintaining severe legal penalties for citizens. Similarly, initial drafts of the 12th Judicial Package contained restrictive measures targeting women's alimony rights and discriminatory clauses against LGBTQ+ individuals; these provisions were only withdrawn following widespread civic mobilization and public backlash.

Expansion of Executive Oversight and Digital Control: Through omnibus legislation, ex-officio authority to block online content and mandate internet access bans was transferred to executive bodies such as the Cyber Security Presidency (Siber Güvenlik Başkanlığı), increasing executive control over digital media. Furthermore, attempts were made to institute mandatory security investigations and archive checks for academic appointments at universities, reflecting an intent to deepen administrative control over higher education, though intense opposition resistance forced a last-minute withdrawal of the provision.

Systemic Rejection of Socio-Economic Relief Motions

While the ruling coalition utilizes its parliamentary majority to pass contested executive packages, it consistently blocks opposition-sponsored bills aimed at mitigating economic hardship. During the 28th Legislative Term, a series of social relief measures supported by civil society and opposition factions were summarily rejected by AKP and MHP votes prior to floor debate:

Proposed MotionPolicy ObjectiveAlliance Legislative Outcome
Minimum Wage AdjustmentElevating the minimum wage to a minimum threshold of 35,000 TLRejected by AKP-MHP votes
Child Nutrition in SchoolsProviding one free meal daily to public school studentsRejected by AKP-MHP votes
Agricultural Debt ReliefWaiving interest on agricultural loans and providing interest-free creditRejected by AKP-MHP votes
Pensions RealignmentRaising minimum pension payouts to parity with the minimum wageRejected by AKP-MHP votes
The systematic rejection of these measures underscores a legislative disconnect between parliamentary outcomes and the immediate socio-economic needs of the population.

Conclusion

The legislative record of the AKP-MHP coalition demonstrates a structural transformation in the function of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. Under the Presidential System of Governance, parliamentary processes have been increasingly reoriented toward executive convenience through the use of omnibus bills, fiscal centralization, selective legal norms, and the systematic dismissal of opposition initiatives. Restoring parliament to its constitutional role as an independent, deliberative, and representative institution remains essential for re-establishing democratic accountability and ensuring that legislation serves the broad public interest.

References

12punto News Report. (2025/2026). Halk için değil, halka karşı: TBMM nasıl etkisizleştirildi? 12punto Legislative Analysis Series, Slides 1–9.

Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM). (2024–2026). 28th Legislative Term Parliamentary Records, Voting Journals, and Committee Reports. Ankara: TBMM Official Gazette.

Official Gazette of the Republic of Türkiye (T.C. Resmi Gazete). Judicial Reform Packages (11th and 12th Packages) and Omnibus Law Proposals. Relevant legislative enactments and executive decrees.

Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2021). The Turkish Presidential System in Practice: Executive Dominance and the Erosion of Legislative Oversight. Turkish Studies, 22(4), 515–538.

Özbudun, E. (2020). Institutional Changes under the Presidential System in Turkey: Legislative-Executive Relations. South European Society and Politics, 25(2), 180–201.

Don't Miss